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Chief of Station. Frankfurt Chief, RE

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hep: Miya 6346

- 1. We have carefully studied reference memorandum and have also discussed it with several staff officers who deal with matters of operational electrones. The following paragraphs will attempt to clarify these matters.
- 2. It should be said first that beadquarters policies with respect to the need for operational clearance have been altered somewhat since the inception of the KIBITZ program. This change has been toward exercising greater care in obtaining operational clearance for agents, due partially to some laxness on the part of the field in using uncleared personnel for assignments definitely requiring such clearance. This is not meant as any criticism of the KIBITZ program, which is only a very small part of the total problem.
- 3. You are, of course, free to spot likely agent candidates without the necessity, at this early point, for obtaining operational clearance. Requests for name checks should be sent to us, hovever, as soon as practicable. There is thus no need for operational clearance for agents who have been spotted and who are merely lying dormant, valting for the propitious moment to arrive when they will be recruited as actual team members, W/F operators or team leaders.
- 4. We are using the term, recruitment, to cover the actual procedure of asking the agent the sixty-four dollar question: whether or not he will nerve our needs. Headquarters policy states that operational clearence must be obtained as soon as the agent is picked out for development as a component of a KIRITZ tesm. However, while it is important that the team leaders and all W/T operators have full clearence, it is equally important that other egents designated as tone members be cleared as well.
- 5. By way of illustrating the principle, KIBITZ 10, a team leader and W/T operator, has full clearance but the other number of his team, KIBITZ 10a. is not cleared and we do not have PRQs on him. Similarly, but on a much larger ecale, it would appear from our analysis of charts and disputches that, for example, the KIBITZ 118 term includes 118, 151, 152, 153 and one undeveloped

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prospect. If this is merely a team on paper" involving no development of the members as yet, there would be less question of the need for clearance. If, on the other hand, the K-118 team is in various stages of development as concerns W/T and other training, then the members thereof should have been processed for clearance. The correct situation is represented by the team of KIBITE 9 and 9e, both of whom have received full clearance.

- 6. In Para. 3 of reference memorandum you state that "we have always been of the belief that full operational clearance would be required of only the radio operator and those few others to whom we will be required to give highly classified training or information." As we have already indicated, this statement goes somewhat further than headquarters policy permits. And while we are not unninful of the fact that you have built up a staybehind system entirely from scratch (and frequently without much direction or help from here), we must emphasize your need to fellow the policy outlined in Para. 4.
- 7. It is particularly essential, we think, that any spotting or recruiting on the part of a W/T operator be avoided. While this problem is only indirectly related to matters discussed above, we are concerned lost the W/T operator -- as the most vulnerable component of a team -- maintain the best possible security vis a vis not only the members of his own unit, but those of other units as well.

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SECHET